Costs

R (on the application of Edwards and another (Appellant)) v Environment Agency and others (Respondents) [2010] UKSC 57 15/12/2010

Fri, 24 Dec 2010 01:34:00 GMT

This is an appeal against a decision of two costs officers appointed to assess costs incurred in
proceedings before the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (‘the House of Lords’). It
considers the approach which should be taken by courts when awarding costs, and costs officers when assessing costs, in cases raising issues about the environment where European law and the Aarhus Convention provide that, because of the nature of such legal proceedings, they should not be ‘prohibitively expensive’.

After the Supreme Court was established, it became the court with jurisdiction in respect of this
matter. In accordance with the Supreme Court rules, two costs officers were appointed to carry out a detailed assessment of costs. The question was whether, when assessing the Respondents’ costs, the costs officers had any jurisdiction to implement the Directives and, if they did, whether in the particular circumstances of this case they should seek to do so. The costs officers decided that compliance with the Directives was a relevant factor for them to take into account unless the court awarding costs had already done so. They would therefore disallow any costs which they considered to be prohibitively expensive. They took the view that the House of Lords had not already decided the point and that they should therefore apply the Aarhus principles in the course of their assessment.

The Supreme Court unanimously sets aside the costs officers’ ruling that they have jurisdiction to implement the Directives, but refers the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling to ascertain what those Directives require. The order for costs of 18 July 2008 is stayed pending the resolution of the reference. Lord Hope gives the Court’s judgment.

Curtis v Revenue & Customs [2007] UKVAT V20330 (30 August 2007)

Thu, 30 Aug 2007 00:00:00 GMT

Services provided by Sole Proprietor Solicitor Liable for VAT. A sole proprietor solicitor failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that his VAT assessment was incorrect. The services in question were to be treated as the provision of legal services rather than disbursements, which brought them within the scope of VAT. A profit element in the charge for land services took it outside the definition of ‘disbursements’ in the relevant EU Directive. The costs of telegraphic services and land registry documents should properly be considered part of the overall legal service. The bank’s charge for transferring money from one account to another was supplied to the solicitor rather than to his client.

Horsford v Bird & Ors, PC(Ant)(Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Mance) 28/11/2006

Tue, 28 Nov 2006 00:00:00 GMT

In the circumstances, there were no factors which justified a departure from the normal expectation, set out in Chrulew v Borm-Reid & Co 1 All ER 953 and preserved by the CPR r.47.18(1), that the party whose bill was being taxed was entitled to his costs of the taxation.

Horton v. Sadler & Anor [2006] UKHL 27 (14 June 2006)

Wed, 14 Jun 2006 00:00:00 GMT

Where a claimant in a personal injury action had initially issued proceedings before the time limit had expired and had brought a second action in respect of the same injuries after expiry, the court could use its discretion under the Limitation Act 1980 s.33 to dis-apply the three-year time limit. The decision in Walkley v Precision Forgings Limited (1979) 1 WLR 606 was overruled, as it had deprived claimants of a right that Parliament had intended them to have, and had given rise to much unsatisfactory jurisprudence.

Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2005] UKHL 61 (20 October 2005)

Thu, 20 Oct 2005 00:00:00 GMT

Costs and Human Rights: The scheme allowing success fees to be recovered from the losing party to an action for defamation was compatible withArt.10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950, therefore a defendant could not argue that the threat of liability to pay a large sum by way of costs infringed its right to freedom of expression.