Personal Injury

R (on the application of McDonald) (Appellant) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (Respondents), [2011] UKSC 33

Thu, 14 Jul 2011 09:52:29 GMT

Background

This appeal concerns the question of whether the Royal Borough acted unlawfully in seeking to amend Ms McDonald’s care package by substituting her night time carer with provision of incontinence pads or absorbent sheets when Ms McDonald was not in fact incontinent.

This case shows how cruel ill health can be. Some 30 years ago Ms McDonald was the prima ballerina of Scottish Ballet. In 1999 Ms McDonald suffered a stroke leaving her with severely limited mobility. She also suffers from a small and neurogenic bladder which means she has to urinate two or three times a night. Up until now she has dealt with this by using a commode with the help of a carer provided by the Royal Borough as part of her care package.

In November 2008 the Royal Borough proposed instead that the appellant should use pads, avoiding the need for a night-time carer. The Royal Borough argued that this would provide Ms McDonald with greater safety (preventing the risk of injury whilst she is assisted to the commode), independence and privacy and in addition reducing the cost of her care by some £22,000 per annum. Ms McDonald’s care plan was reviewed in November 2009 and April 2010.

Ms McDonald seeks to challenge this proposal. Ms McDonald maintains that the thought of being treated as incontinent (which she is not) and having to use pads is an intolerable affront to her dignity.

Earlier judgments

The High Court dismissed Ms McDonald’s arguments and held that it was open to the Royal Borough to meet Ms McDonald’s need, identified in her needs assessment as “assistance to use the commode at night”, in a more economical manner by the provision of pads.

The Court of Appeal disagreed holding that the clear language of Ms McDonald’s needs assessment could not be extended in a way proposed by the High Court and at the time proceedings were commenced the Royal Borough was in breach of its statutory duty. However, as the Royal Borough did not implement the proposal outlined above and had reassessed Ms McDonald’s care plan Ms McDonald had no substantial complaint.

Supreme Court judgment

By a majority of 4-1 Ms McDonald’s appeal was dismissed.

Reasoning

Ms McDonald put forward four arguments (The Supreme Court’s reasoning is outlined below each heading):

1. The care plan reviews did not in fact contain a reassessment of her needs

In accordance with the “Fair Access to Care Services” guidance issued by the Secretary of State, the care review plans could and did in fact incorporate a review of Ms McDonald’s needs. Care plan reviews are usually drafted by social workers and not lawyers and thus should be construed in a practical way.

2. The decision breached Ms McDonald’s rights under article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights

Ms McDonald had not established interference with her article 8 rights. However, even if article 8 interference was established, it would be justified under article 8(2) on the ground that it is (a) necessary for the economic well-being of the Royal Borough and the interests of other service-users and (b) a proportionate response to Ms McDonald’s needs by affording her greater privacy and protection from injury.

3. The decision was taken in breach of section 21 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995

Under section 21 the Royal Borough may not operate any “practice, policy or procedure” which makes it impossible or unreasonably difficult for disabled persons to receive any benefit conferred on them. Ms McDonald failed to show that the Royal Borough’s decision could properly be characterised as “practice, policy or procedure” and thus the Royal Borough did not breach its second 21 duty. Even if that were not so, the Royal Borough’s acts would have been justified as constituting “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim” within the mean of section 21D(5) of the 1995 Act.

4. The Royal Borough failed to have due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity of disabled persons under section 49A of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (now superseded by comparable provisions in the Equality Act 2010)

Where the Royal Borough is discharging its functions under statutes which expressly direct its attention to the needs of the disabled persons, it may be entirely superfluous to make express reference to section 49A of the 1995 Act. It would be absurd on the facts of the present case to infer a breach of section 49A from an omission to refer to that section in any of the Royal Borough’s documentation.

Dissenting opinion

The dissenting Justice would have allowed Ms McDonald’s appeal on a different basis outlined by Age UK in its intervention, namely that it was irrational for the Royal Borough to characterise Ms McDonald as having a need different from one she in fact has.

Baker (Respondent) v Quantum Clothing Group Limited (Appellants) and others, 13/04/2011, [2011] UKSC 17

Fri, 15 Apr 2011 00:13:21 GMT

This appeal concerns the liability of employers in the knitting industry of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire for hearing loss suffered by employees prior to 1 January 1990. The central issue is whether liability existed at common law in negligence and/or under s.29(1) of the Factories Act 1961 towards an employee who suffered noise-induced hearing loss due to exposure to noise levels between 85 and 90dB(A)lepd.

Mrs Baker brought a claim against her employers, for whom liability now rests with Quantum Clothing Group Ltd, one of the Appellants. Mrs Baker’s claim was dismissed on the basis that her employers had not committed any breach of common law or statutory duty.

The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by Mrs Baker and reached conclusions less favourable to all four employers than those arrived at by the judge at first instance. The Court held that liability at common law arose in January 1988 for employers with an average degree of knowledge, which included Guy Warwick. Quantum, Meridian and Pretty Polly were found to have had greater than average knowledge and were liable at common law from late 1983.

The Supreme Court allows the appeal by a majority of 3:2 and restores the judge’s decision at first instance. Lord Mance gives the lead judgment. Lord Dyson gives an additional concurring judgment, and Lord Saville agrees with both. Lord Kerr and Lord Clarke give dissenting judgments.

The Supreme Court first dealt with common law liability in negligence. The central question was whether a 1972 Code of Practice published by the Department of Employment, which recommended a noise exposure limit of 90dB(A)lepd, constituted an acceptable standard for average employers to adhere to during the 1970s and 1980s. The judge at first instance had found that it did until the terms of a draft European Directive of 1986, which proposed a lower limit, came to be generally known in 1988 via a consultative document. The Court upheld that conclusion of the judge. Examination of the underlying statistical material did not undermine the relevance of the Code as a guide to acceptable practice. It was official and clear guidance which set an appropriate standard upon which a reasonable and prudent employer could legitimately rely in conducting his business until the late 1980s.

The Court also endorsed a further two year period beyond 1988 allowed by the judge for implementing protective measures, thus meaning that the average employer had no common law liability before 1 January 1990. The Court of Appeal had been incorrect to replace that period with a period of six to nine months. On the facts, Quantum and Guy Warwick were in the position of average employers to whom the 1 January 1990 date applied. Courtaulds and Pretty Polly, however, were in a special position. By the beginning of 1983 they had an understanding of the risk that some workers would suffer damage from exposure to between 85 and 90dB(A)lepd, which distinguished their position from that of the average employer. Allowing a further two years to implement protective measures, they were potentially liable at common law from the beginning of 1985.

The Court then dealt with liability under s.29(1) of the 1961 Act. In construing the section, the Court first held that a workplace may be unsafe within the meaning of the section not only due to its physical fabric, but also due to activities carried on in it. The next question was whether the section applies to risks created by noise. The Court held that it did, on the basis that the section could accommodate attitudes to safety that were not held at the time when it was enacted. Thirdly, the Court held that what is “safe” is a relative concept that must be judged having regard to general knowledge and standards at the time of the alleged breach of duty. Finally, the Court held that the qualification, “so far as is reasonably practicable”, also allows such general knowledge and standards to be taken into account. Applying that construction, the section did not impose in this respect a more stringent liability than at common law. The employers by complying with the Code of Practice were not in breach of the statutory duty before like dates as those from which they were potentially liable at common law.

Lord Kerr and Lord Clarke dissented. They held that the terms of the Code of Practice and other material available by 1976 were such that employers should have been aware that damage to hearing could occur at levels below 90dB(A)lepd and that certain individuals in the workforce would be particularly vulnerable at those levels. Further, the employers should have been aware that they could have reduced that risk at not inordinate cost by the provision of ear protection. Liability therefore arose at common law from the late 1970s onwards. As to liability under s.29(1), the concept of safety, unlike the qualification of reasonable practicability, does not include an assessment of what was foreseeable at the time. On the facts, the workplaces were not safe and it was reasonably practicable to provide ear protection. The dissenting Justices therefore held that employers were liable under the section from 1978 as held by the Court of Appeal.

Oceanbulk Shipping & Trading SA (Respondent) v TMT Asia Limited & others (Appellants) [2010] UKSC 44

Thu, 04 Nov 2010 22:40:59 GMT

This appeal concerns the scope of the exceptions to the principle that statements made in the course of ‘without prejudice’ negotiations are not admissible in evidence (“the without prejudice rule”). The issue is whether it is permissible to refer to anything written or said in the course of the without prejudice negotiations to help interpret any agreement which results from the negotiations.

The appellants, TMT Asia Limited and others, and the respondent, Oceanbulk Shipping & Trading SA, had entered into a number of forward freight agreements. When the appellants failed to pay a sum due under those agreements, the parties entered into settlement negotiations which were expressed to be without prejudice. The negotiations resulted in a written settlement agreement in respect of the sum due. The respondent brought a claim for damages against the appellants alleging breach of a clause of the settlement agreement. In their defence the appellants sought to rely on statements made during the without prejudice negotiations in support of their interpretation of the clause. The respondent contended that reliance on the statements was precluded by the without prejudice rule.

The High Court held that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of determining how the terms of the settlement agreement were to be construed notwithstanding the without prejudice rule. The majority of the Court of Appeal (Longmore and Stanley Burnton LJJ), however, allowed Oceanbulk’s appeal, holding that the evidence was not admissible.

The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal. The substantive judgment was given by Lord Clarke, with whom the other Justices agreed. Lord Clarke reached the conclusion that justice clearly demanded that the interpretation exception should be recognised as an exception to the without prejudice rule.

Gray v Thames Trains & Ors [2009] UKHL 33 (17 June 2009)

Thu, 06 Aug 2009 15:26:28 GMT

Damages Caused as a Consequence of the Claimant Committing Manslaughter were Ex Turpi Causa
The House of Lords held that a Claimant who had suffered psychological problems as a result of the negligence of the Defendant could not recover losses suffered as a consequence of a criminal act he had committed (and consequential sentence imposed upon him) as a result of those problems. The Court of Appeal had been correct to hold that it was an aspect of the ex turpi causa principle, based upon public policy, that the Claimant could not recover damages. Although it was true that the Claimant’s earning capacity would have been impaired by his condition in any event, the principle in Jobling v. Associated Dairies (1982) precluded liability.

Smith (Appellant) v Northamptonshire County Council (Respondents), [2009] UKHL 27

Wed, 20 May 2009 14:50:00 GMT

The appellant, Mrs Smith, was employed by the respondents (“the council”) as a driver and carer. As part of her job she was required to collect people who were in need of care from their homes and take them by minibus to a day centre. One of those whom she had to collect, Mrs Cotter, was confined to a wheelchair. To get her out of her house the appellant had to take her down a wooden ramp outside the doors which led from the living room to a patio. This was a task that she performed many times without incident. But as she was doing this on 1 December 2004 an edge of the ramp crumbled beneath her foot, causing her to stumble and sustain injury.

The appellant raised proceedings against the council, claiming damages. Her case proceeded based upon an allegation that the council was in breach of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998.

The question which the judge had to decide was whether the1998 Regulations applied in this case. The judge held that they did apply because the ramp was “work equipment” as defined by reg 2(1) and it was being “used at work” within reg 3(1). It followed that there was a breach of reg 5(1). The council appealed, and the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It held that the ramp was not work equipment used by the appellant at work for the purposes of the Regulations. The most significant factors in this case were that the ramp had been installed by people other than the council’s own employees (it had been placed there by the NHS), that the council had no ability to maintain it and that in ordinary parlance it was part of Mrs Cotter’s premises.

The appellant appealed to the House of Lords.

By a majority of 3:2, the House dismissed the appeal. The majority held that liability for the condition of the ramp should not attach to the respondent employer. The respondent council did not supply or repair the ramp. It had inspected it at an earlier stage, but, it was merely being careful of its employees’ safety and such care should not give rise to liability which is not otherwise covered by its statutory duty. Further, the ramp did not come within the respondent’s undertaking or establishment.

Ofulue v.Bossert, HL, (11 March 2009)

Wed, 11 Mar 2009 10:58:00 GMT

Without Prejudice Correspondence Not Admissible in Subsequent Proceedings Unless Wholly Unconnected

Mitchell (AP) and another (AP) (Original Respondents and Cross-appellants) v Glasgow City Council (Original Appellants and Cross-respondents) (Scotland), [2009] UKHL 11

Wed, 18 Feb 2009 22:27:00 GMT

In July 2001 Mr Mitchell was violently assaulted by his neighbour Mr Drummond and died from his injuries. Both Mr Mitchell and Mr Drummond were tenants of Glasgow City Council and the latter’s propensity for violence and anti-social behaviour towards, in particular, Mr Mitchell, were well-documented and known to the Council. The final and fatal violence in July followed a meeting on that day between Council officials and Mr Drummond at which the Council officials had informed Mr Drummond that a notice of proceedings to recover possession of his council dwelling would be served on him and that any continuance of his anti-social behaviour could lead to his eviction.

Mr Mitchell’s widow and daughter sought to hold the Council liable in damages for loss, injury and damage as a result of fault and negligence of the Council. The damages claim was based also on the contention that the Council acted unlawfully and in a way incompatible with Mr Mitchell’s Convention right to life.

What is alleged to be a breach of a common law duty of care owed by the Council to Mr Mitchell, is that the Council neither warned Mr Mitchell that the meeting was about to be held nor, following the meeting, warned him that it had been held, thereby denying Mr Mitchell the opportunity, forewarned, of taking precautions to safeguard himself from the possibly violent reactions of Mr Drummond.

The House of Lords unanimously allowed the Council’s appeal on the duty of care issue. The Council’s obligation to Mr Mitchell was to act as a responsible landlord and to take steps to terminate Mr Drummond’s tenancy in order to remove him from the locality where he was causing trouble. That obligation did not suffice to justify treating the Council as having assumed responsibility for Mr Mitchell’s safety. The Council did not have any delictual duty to protect Mr Mitchell against assaults from Mr Drummond that the Council’s steps might possibly provoke. The attempt to found an action upon the Council’s failure to warn was an attempt to found an action upon a mere omission.

With regard to the cross-appeal the House of Lords held that there was no basis in the pursuers’ averments for saying that the defenders ought to have known that, when Mr Drummond left the meeting, there was a real and immediate risk to the deceased’s life. Accordingly, the House unanimously dismissed the cross-appeal.

Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle [2008] UKHL 50 (30 July 2008)

Wed, 30 Jul 2008 00:00:00 GMT

Police do not Owe Common Law Duty to Individuals: The House of Lords held, overruling the Court of Appeal with Lord Bingham dissenting, that in order for a claimant to establish that the police were under a duty to protect a witness who had been threatened, the court must be satisfied that the relevant authorities knew or ought to have known “at the time” of the existence of “a real and immediate risk to the life” of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party. Although there may be cases where the absence of a remedy to the claimant would be an affront to public policy, in ordinary circumstances the principle established by the House in Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1989) should be preserved.

Spencer-Franks (Appellant) v Kellogg Brown and Root Limited and others (Respondents) (Scotland), [2008] UKHL 46

Wed, 02 Jul 2008 12:36:00 GMT

In 2003, the pursuer was employed as a mechanical technician by Kellogg Brown and Root Ltd (“KBR”), then a subsidiary of Halliburton which supplies services to the offshore oil industry. KBR contracted to supply workers to operate the Tartan Alpha platform in the Scottish sector of the North Sea, which was operated by Talisman Energy (UK) Ltd (“Talisman”). The pursuer was one of the workers which KBR supplied to work on the platform.

In October 2003, the closer on the door of the central control room was not working properly and the appellant was asked to inspect and repair it. In the course of removing the closer to take it away for repair, the appellant half turned a screw which held the linkage arm to the door frame. This should not have disengaged the screw. However, the screw pulled out and the arm struck the pursuer in the face. He lost four teeth which had to be replaced by implants.

The pursuer raised an action against KBR and Talisman in the sheriff court claiming that each of them had been in breach of its obligations under the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 (“the equipment regulations”).

The pursuer submitted that the incident was covered by the equipment regulations as the door closer was a piece of machinery or apparatus for use at work. The defenders took pleas to the relevancy on the ground that the door closer could not be work equipment within the meaning of the regulations.

The sheriff sustained the plea of KBR, the employer, on the ground that although the door closer was “work equipment", the employer had no control over it and the regulations therefore did not impose responsibility upon it. On the other hand, Talisman, the operator, did have control. He therefore repelled their plea to the relevancy and allowed the pursuer’s proof.

Both the pursuer and Talisman appealed. The Second Division of the Court of Session, took the view that the door closer was not “work equipment” or, even if it was, that the pursuer was not “using” it within the meaning of the regulations. They therefore dismissed the pursuer’s appeal and allowed KBR’s appeal.

The pursuer appealed to the House of Lords.

The House of Lords held (unanimously) that the door closer was work equipment and that the appellant was using the door closer when he was injured. The work equipment regulations used the words “for use at work.” The door in question was used to enter and exit the control room and everyone using the control room was using it for the purposes of their work. Consequently, the closer attached to that door was work equipment. The door closer did not cease to be work equipment because it had broken down or was being repaired.

The House of Lords went on to hold that it could not be excluded by some implied qualification. For example, it rejected the argument that the equipment regulations impliedly excluded apparatus which formed part of the premises upon which the work took place. The House of Lords noted that this might have been a good argument for ordinary work premises on land but not for equipment which was attached to an offshore platform. Reference was made to Regulation 5(1) of the Offshore Installations (Operational Safety, Health and Welfare) Regulations 1976.

The House of Lords allowed the appeal, recalled the interlocutors of the Court of Session and the Sheriff and allowed the parties a proof.

Corr v IBC Vehicles Ltd [2008] UKHL 13 (27 February 2008)

Wed, 27 Feb 2008 00:00:00 GMT

Reporting Restrictions: Loss Attributable to Suicide Recoverable Under Fatal Accidents Act: The House of Lords, upholding the decision of the Court of Appeal, held that the widow of an employee who had committed suicide as a consequence of depression caused by his employer’s negligence could recover under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. Whilst the Deceased was not insane at the time of his death, it could not be said that he was fully responsible for his own actions. The deceased’s conduct was not an unforeseeable consequence of the tort, nor did it constitute a novus actus. The Deceased was not volenti to the tort itself, only to the suicide, which he did not approach with his eyes open because of his psychological condition.

A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6 (30 January 2008)

Wed, 30 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT

Correct Approach to Limitation in Sexual Abuse Cases: The Lords allowed the appeals of six appellants who had been victims of sexual abuse during childhood and whose claims had been adjudged to be statute barred. It was held that the test under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1980 was an entirely impersonal one; once it was established what the claimant knew and what they could be treated as having known, the actual claimant effectively dropped out the picture. The decision in Stubbings v. Webb (1993) was departed from; it was observed that unsatisfactory House of Lords decisions are invariably distinguished by lower courts on inadequate grounds.

Johnston v. NEI International Combustion Ltd [2007] UKHL 39 (17 October 2007)

Wed, 17 Oct 2007 00:00:00 GMT

Pleural Plaques do not Amount to Actionable Damage. The House of Lords held that symptomless pleural plaques caused by negligent exposure to asbestos were not actionable damage. Pleural plaques do not themselves cause asbestos related diseases, but they signal the presence of asbestos fibres that might independently cause serious diseases. The appellants had contended that although the plaques were symptomless, they carried with them the risk of future disease and consequent anxiety. Their Lordships held that the plaques were likely to never cause the claimants any symptoms, nor increase their susceptibility to other diseases. The risk of future disease can only be taken into account when considering some other compensatable physical injury; it does not give rise to a cause of action in itself.

Gawler v. Raettig, unreported, HL, 13/6/07

Wed, 13 Jun 2007 00:00:00 GMT

Appropriate Reduction for Failure to wear a Seat-belt. The House of Lords rejected a petition from the Defendant seeking a ‘leapfrog’ appeal from the decision of the QBD of 01.03.07. There Gray J had held that public policy did not require any reconsideration of the approach laid down by the Court of Appeal in Froom v. Butcher for determining the appropriate reduction to awards of damages to reflect the claimant’s contributory negligence in failing to wear a seat-belt. The appropriate reduction in such cases is 25%.

Phillips & Co & Anor v. Whatley (Gilbraltar) [2007] UKPC 28 (2 May 2007)

Wed, 02 May 2007 00:00:00 GMT

Loss of a Chance of Establishing Liability. In an action against a law firm for loss of a chance to pursue a claim for damages for personal injury against an employer, the Privy Council substituted its own assessment of the prospects of establishing liability and of successful recovery of any damages awarded.

Police Service of Northern Ireland v McCaughey, HL (NI) (Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Brown of Easton-under-Heywood, Lord Mance) 28/03/2007

Wed, 28 Mar 2007 00:00:00 GMT

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. Inquest – Jury verdicts. A jury in Northern Ireland may not return a verdict of lawful or unlawful killing. The Coroners Act (Northern Ireland) 1959 s.8 required the police service of Northern Ireland to furnish to a coroner to whom notice under s.8 is given such information as it then had or was thereafter able to obtain (subject to any relevant privilege or immunity) concerning the finding of a body or concerning the death.

Robb v. Salamis (M & I) Ltd (Scotland) [2006] UKHL 56 (13 December 2006)

Wed, 13 Dec 2006 00:00:00 GMT

An employer was in breach of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 reg.4 and reg.20 by providing removable suspended ladders for employees to access the top bunks in their sleeping accommodation because the risk of injury, if the ladders were not replaced properly, should have been foreseen. An employee injured when descending an incorrectly replaced ladder was contributorily negligent because he knew that the ladders were often moved and should have checked the ladder.

Smith & Anr v Harris, PC(Cl)(Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carswell, Lord Mance) 30/10/2006; [2006] UKPC 48

Mon, 30 Oct 2006 00:00:00 GMT

The judge and the Court of Appeal of the Cayman Islands had been justified in holding that the appellant was solely to blame for a road traffic accident in which his car collided with the respondent's car, and in finding that the physical evidence was not inconsistent with the respondent's version of events leading up to the accident.

Majrowski v Guy’s & St. Thomas’ NHS Trust, HL ( Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Hope of Craighead, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carswell, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood) 12/7/2006; Times, July 17, 2006; Independent, July 14, 2006

Fri, 14 Jul 2006 00:00:00 GMT

An employer could be vicariously liable in damages under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.3 for a course of conduct by one of its employees that amounted to harassment in breach of s.1 of that Act.

Harding v. Wealands [2006] UKHL 32 (5 July 2006)

Wed, 05 Jul 2006 00:00:00 GMT

The English court dealing with a personal injury claim in respect of a road traffic accident that occurred in New South Wales had to apply English law to the assessment of damages as a matter of procedure to be regulated by the law of the forum under the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 s.14 and was not to apply the procedural provisions of the New South Wales Motor Accident Compensation Act 1999 limiting the amount of damages recoverable.

Sutradhar v. Natural Environment Research Council [2006] UKHL 33 (5 July 2006)

Wed, 05 Jul 2006 00:00:00 GMT

A Bangladeshi suffering from arsenical poisoning had no reasonable prospect of success in an action against the Natural Environment Research Council for negligence arising from a geological report that, according to him, had induced the health authorities in Bangladesh not to take steps that would have ensured that his drinking water was not contaminated by arsenic.

Barker v Corus (UK) Plc, HL (Lord Hoffman, Lord Scott of Foscoite, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of Richmond) 3/5/2006; Times, May 4, 2006

Wed, 03 May 2006 00:00:00 GMT

Several liability of employers for negligent exposure to asbestos. Where employers were liable on the basis that they had negligently exposed an employee to asbestos and thereby created a material risk of mesothelioma which had eventuated, it would be fair that they should be severally liable only to the extent of the share of the risk created by their breach of duty.

Watkins v Home Office & Ors [2006] UKHL 17 (29 March 2006)

Wed, 29 Mar 2006 00:00:00 GMT

Misfeasance in Public Office – Not actionable without proof of material damage

Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation [2005] UKHL 72 (8 December 2005)

Thu, 08 Dec 2005 00:00:00 GMT

International Aviation Law – Warsaw Convention on International Carriage by Air 1929. A passenger who suffers DVT on a normal international flight would not have suffered an "accident" within the meaning of Art.17 of the Warsaw Convention on International Carriage by Air 1929 and therefore could not succeed in a claim against the airline. An accident for the purposes of Art.17 requires an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger.

Strachan v. The Gleaner Company Ltd & Anor (Jamaica) [2005] UKPC 33 (25 July 2005)

Mon, 25 Jul 2005 00:00:00 GMT

Judicature (Civil Procedure Code) Law (Jamacia): The Supreme Court of Jamaica was not deprived of jurisdiction to set aside a judgment in default of defence under s.258 of the Judicature (Civil Procedure Code) Law (Jamaica), even though damages had been subsequently assessed and a final judgment had been entered. Further, it was held that where an order to set aside a default judgment had been made without jurisdiction, a judge of a co-ordinate jurisdiction had no power to set it aside.

Brooks v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Ors [2005] UKHL 24 (21 April 2005)

Thu, 21 Apr 2005 00:00:00 GMT

Victims of crime: A victim of crime and eye witness to a murder could not proceed in claiming damages for negligence against the police for his treatment by the police. The Claimant argued that the police owed a duty of care to: (i) take reasonable steps to assess whether B was a victim of crime and then to accord him reasonably appropriate protection, support, assistance and treatment if he was so assessed; (ii) take reasonable steps to afford B the protection, assistance and support commonly afforded to a key eye-witness to a serious crime of violence; and (iii) afford reasonable weight to the account that B gave and to act upon it accordingly. The House of Lords held that such duties should not be imposed upon the police since to do so would cut across the freedom of action they ought to have when investigating serious crime.

JD v. East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust & Ors [2005] UKHL 23 (21 April 2005)

Thu, 21 Apr 2005 00:00:00 GMT

Duty of Care – Investigating suspected child abuse: It was held that health professionals responsible for investigating suspected child abuse did not owe a parent suspected of having committed the abuse a duty of care in damages if they carried out their investigation in good faith but carelessly.

Brooks v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis & Ors [2005] UKHL 24 (21 April 2005)

Thu, 21 Apr 2005 00:00:00 GMT

Duty of Care – Eyewitness to murder: The victim of a crime, who had been an eye-witness to a murder, was not permitted to proceed with a claim for damages in negligence against the police for the manner in which he had been treated by the police. Following Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (1988) 138 NLJ 126, there was no basis for sensibly imposing on the police any of the three legal duties asserted by the respondent, as those duties would cut across the freedom of action which the police ought to have when investigating crime.