Claimant’s liability for costs incurred by Defendant before permission to apply for JR. In the context of a costs order in judicial review proceedings, which stated that the unsuccessful claimant was to pay "75 per cent of the costs of this claim not to include costs of the permission hearing...", it had been open to the judge in a detailed assessment hearing to order that the claimant was liable for 75 per cent of the costs reasonably incurred by the defendant prior to the grant of permission ...
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Third Party Costs Order. A judge was right to make a third party costs order against a director of a company that had had a claim for unpaid fees dismissed and had judgment made against it on a counterclaim, in circumstances where the identity of the director and the company and the interests of the director and of the company were so close that it would be unjust not to make the director liable for costs.
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While non-compliance with a rule, practice direction or court order was the only jurisdictional requirement for the exercise of the power contained in CPR r.44.14 it would usually be appropriate as a matter of discretion to consider the extent of the misconduct which had occurred in the course of the non-compliance.
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In a case where it had been found that the successful party had been dishonest, the fact that the paying party had not sought an order from the judge reflecting that misconduct did not preclude the paying party, when it came to the assessment of costs, from referring to the finding of dishonesty when considering whether the costs incurred by the dishonest party were reasonable.
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In the circumstances, there were no factors which justified a departure from the normal expectation, set out in Chrulew v Borm-Reid & Co 1 All ER 953 and preserved by the CPR r.47.18(1), that the party whose bill was being taxed was entitled to his costs of the taxation.
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Where a court, despite granting permission to appeal, had made an unless order, with the effect that if security for costs was not put up by the claimant the action would be struck out before any appeal came on for hearing, the order was inappropriate. If a default judgment had been entered pursuant to the order but the claimant within a short time had come to the court with the right sum the court should be willing to consider granting relief and setting aside the default judgment.
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Where the costs of litigation were sought to be recovered as damages in a negligence action, the appropriate method of assessment was the amount that would be awarded on assessment by a costs judge on the standard basis.
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Where successful claimants had lost on a distinct issue, it was appropriate to order them to bear certain of their own costs of that issue and pay certain of those of their opponents.
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The test under the Limitation Act 1980 s.14(2) to determine when a person would reasonably have considered an injury to be sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages was an objective one. That a person was inhibited by the injury itself from instituting proceedings was a factor to be taken into account.
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On the facts, time had started to run for limitation purposes when the employee's doctor concluded that there was a real possibility that his working conditions had caused his hand arm vibration syndrome, as that would have put the reasonable man on notice to investigate the link further. However, it had been open to the judge on the evidence to disapply the primary limitation period.
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