While non-compliance with a rule, practice direction or court order was the only jurisdictional requirement for the exercise of the power contained in CPR r.44.14 it would usually be appropriate as a matter of discretion to consider the extent of the misconduct which had occurred in the course of the non-compliance.
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In a case where it had been found that the successful party had been dishonest, the fact that the paying party had not sought an order from the judge reflecting that misconduct did not preclude the paying party, when it came to the assessment of costs, from referring to the finding of dishonesty when considering whether the costs incurred by the dishonest party were reasonable.
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In the circumstances, there were no factors which justified a departure from the normal expectation, set out in Chrulew v Borm-Reid & Co 1 All ER 953 and preserved by the CPR r.47.18(1), that the party whose bill was being taxed was entitled to his costs of the taxation.
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Where a court, despite granting permission to appeal, had made an unless order, with the effect that if security for costs was not put up by the claimant the action would be struck out before any appeal came on for hearing, the order was inappropriate. If a default judgment had been entered pursuant to the order but the claimant within a short time had come to the court with the right sum the court should be willing to consider granting relief and setting aside the default judgment.
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Where the costs of litigation were sought to be recovered as damages in a negligence action, the appropriate method of assessment was the amount that would be awarded on assessment by a costs judge on the standard basis.
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Where successful claimants had lost on a distinct issue, it was appropriate to order them to bear certain of their own costs of that issue and pay certain of those of their opponents.
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The test under the Limitation Act 1980 s.14(2) to determine when a person would reasonably have considered an injury to be sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages was an objective one. That a person was inhibited by the injury itself from instituting proceedings was a factor to be taken into account.
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On the facts, time had started to run for limitation purposes when the employee's doctor concluded that there was a real possibility that his working conditions had caused his hand arm vibration syndrome, as that would have put the reasonable man on notice to investigate the link further. However, it had been open to the judge on the evidence to disapply the primary limitation period.
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A judge had been correct to rule that a claim issued in 2004, by a claimant who had suffered the symptoms of hand and arm vibration syndrome since 1992, was time barred as the claimant had actual knowledge of the disease in 2003 and constructive knowledge from at least 1997 and probably from 1992.
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A convenient way to determine whether an amendment to the particulars of claim outside of the limitation period could be justified pursuant to CPR r.19.5(3) was to ask whether the identity of the claimant could be changed without significantly altering the nature of the claim. In the instant case, the amendments required would have been too substantial.
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