A party who had an after-the-event insurance policy with staged premiums should have informed its opponent of that fact and should have set out the trigger moments when the second or later stages would be reached.
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The trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion in directing a Sanderson order against the unsuccessful party who, in defending the claim, had sought to blame the claimant's employer.
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In the circumstances, where a respondent had misrepresented to the court that all the parties to proceedings had agreed to an adjournment, the judge's exercise of discretion when making no order as to costs was seriously flawed and there had been no reason to deprive an appellant of her costs.
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As the claimants had shown that there was a real risk that any judgments made in their favour would not be satisfied, freezing orders in varying amounts were made against the defendant.
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The judge had been right to join an individual to the proceedings and make him jointly and severally liable for the costs of the successful defendants where he had controlled the proceedings brought by the claimant company, funded those proceedings and would have benefited from them if they had been successful.
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When determining whether a solicitor had failed to satisfy a condition referred to in the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 s.58(3) it was not necessary to consider whether the client had suffered actual prejudice.
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The court determined liability for costs following a claim in which each party had won on one of the two key issues, but where the claimant was successful overall on a point raised only shortly before the trial began.
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It was just to make a third party costs order against a non-party whose actions were responsible for effectively depriving a claimant of any realistic opportunity of recovering its costs.
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A pre-action disclosure order was made where it would offer a real prospect of achieving the objective of more focused proceedings.
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Where a claimant in a personal injury action had initially issued proceedings before the time limit had expired and had brought a second action in respect of the same injuries after expiry, the court could use its discretion under the Limitation Act 1980 s.33 to dis-apply the three-year time limit. The decision in Walkley v Precision Forgings Limited (1979) 1 WLR 606 was overruled, as it had deprived claimants of a right that Parliament had intended them to have, and had given rise to much unsat ...
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