The appellant (N) appealed against a decision of the Administrative Court upholding an order for his extradition to the United States. The court was required to determine whether: (i) it could properly require a person resisting extradition on art.8 grounds to demonstrate exceptional circumstances; (ii) the gravity of the crime in respect of which extradition was sought was a relevant factor; (iii) the interference with family life had to be considered only from the point of view of the person w ...
|
The United States Government is seeking the extradition of the appellant, Mr Norris, so he may be tried on an indictment charging him with obstruction of justice. He had originally faced a further charge of price fixing. The House of Lords ruled in 2008 ([2008] UKHL 16) that the conduct alleged in relation to the price fixing charge was not capable of amounting to an extradition offence as it was not a crime under English law when it was committed. His case was then sent back to the district jud ...
|
The Appellant (D) appealed against an order for his extradition to the Netherlands on the basis of conviction in absence (section 20). D had been convicted and sentenced to four years' imprisonment in his absence in the Netherlands. At the time of the trial D was a prisoner at a Polish prison. The Judicial Authority produced documentation that D had been personally served with a trial summons and with documents in Polish and Dutch informing him of the trial and his right to be legally represente ...
|
The appellant, Mr Louca, was a Cypriot national whose arrest in England and surrender to the Federal Republic of Germany for trial of six alleged offences of tax evasion was sought by the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Bielefeld pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant. The warrant was certified by the Serious Organised Crime Agency (“SOCA”) pursuant to s.2(7) of the Extradition Act 2003. Mr Louca challenged its validity on the ground that it contained no reference to two prev ...
|
Each of the two appellants, Mr Goodyer, a UK national, and Mr Gomes, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, is wanted by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago (“Trinidad”) for trial there on charges of possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking. Each was arrested in the UK following an extradition request by Trinidad and each unsuccessfully argued before the District Judge at their respective extradition hearings, first, pursuant to ss.79(1)(c) and 82 of the Extradition A ...
|
Where a delay had occurred in extradition proceedings, resulting from the fleeing of the accused from the jurisdiction in which he was bailed to appear, he could not rely on any subsequent culpable delay on the part of the requesting state to argue that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of passage of time pursuant to the Extradition Act 2003 s.82. The case of Krzyzowski v Poland (2007) EWHC 2754 (Admin) correctly stated the law on the passage of time bar to extradition, ...
|
These two appeals concern the time limits in Part 1 and Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 governing appeals to the High Court against an order of a District Judge permitting extradition. s.26(4) and s.103(9) provide that “Notice of an appeal … must be given in accordance with rules of court before the end of …. [7 or 14] days starting with the day on which the order is made". Three questions of principle arise: (a) Must the appeal notice be both filed in the High Court a ...
|
The State of Missouri alleges that the appellant, Wellington, committed two murders in Kansas City and he is charged with murder in the first degree. The appellant was arrested in London on a provisional warrant. The United States requested his extradition. The prosecutor in Missouri gave an undertaking that he would not seek the death penalty. Some time was then taken up with an unsuccessful challenge to the committal by judicial review but the Home Secretary later notified the appe ...
|
The imposition of a life sentence would not necessarily infringe Art.3. While an irreducible life sentence might raise an issue under Art.3 but would not necessarily infringe it, a life sentence that was not irreducible would not even raise an issue. Moreover, the bar for what counted as irreducible was set high; power to release someone from a life would mean the sentence was not irreducible. The test of what constituted inhuman or degrading punishment within the meaning of the Euro ...
|
The appellant faced two charges of murder in Missouri, for which the mandatory penalty was imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole or release, except by the act of the Governor. He challenged the decision to order his extradition on the basis that it breached his rights under ECHR 1950 art.3, arguing that a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole constituted inhuman or degrading punishment. HELD: A complaint under art.3 could not be made simply beca ...
|
| 1 2 |