When ruling on a submission of no case to answer to a charge of murder, the Eastern Caribbean CA had erred by failing to apply the test of determining what inferences a reasonable jury properly directed might draw, as distinct from those which the court itself thought could or could not be drawn.
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Evidence of a dual criminal purpose had to be shown for a conviction for capital murder under s.2(1)(d) OAPA 1864 in Jamaica.
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(1) Under s.3(1) Prevention of Corruption Act 1987, it was not necessary to prove that any person serving under the state or other public body, or holding a public office, was aware of the improper offer having been made, or the bribe having been passed, provided that the apparent purpose of the transaction was to affect the conduct of such a person corruptly. (2) D had been entitled to the benefit of a conventional direction on credibility which had not been given. Although the CA had been rig ...
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In cases of a defence of provocation, the jury must evaluate the gravity of the provocation by starting with the defendant's subjective characteristics and then applying a single, objective standard of the degree of self-control to be expected of a normal person of the defendant's sex and age when assessing whether his loss of self-control was such as to meet the defence. In this case, it was held therefore that the jury could have taken the defendant’s disease of alcoholism into account when ...
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Where it is possible to substitute an offence of causing death by reckless driving with that of manslaughter, juries should be directed on the definition of recklessness if they are to properly consider the charge of manslaughter. In such jurisdictions (e.g. Jamaica, but not England & Wales), the definition of recklessness set out in R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510 and R v Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493 applied, despite the later decision of R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171.
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The incompetence of defence counsel at trial in failing to convey his client's good character and to ensure that the judge directed the jury appropriately could be sufficient grounds for setting aside a guilty verdict as unsafe.
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There was no breach of a defendant’s constitutional right where through his own fault he was unrepresented at trial but a judge or magistrate should not cross examine a defendant in a manner that suggested the judge was siding with the prosecution.
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