On 4 November 2008 at Fort William Sheriff Court the Accused pled guilty to a charge of breach of the peace in the followin g terms:- "That between 1 July 2007 and 17 August 2007, both dates inclusive, at [an address in Fort William] and elsewhere in Scotland [he] did conduct [himself] in a disorderly manner and did repeatedly telephone [F]... and make sexual comments, placing her in a state of fear and alarm and commit a breach of the peace." By virtue of Section 80 of the Sexual Offences Act 2 ...
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There was no right of appeal under the Extradition Act 2003 against a decision of a magistrates' court to give its consent under s.55(6) of the Act to a request from a requesting state that an extraditee serve a sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him in respect of a conviction which did not form the basis of his original extradition.
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Magistrates had not been entitled to convict a driver of driving while disqualified where there had been no admissible evidence of his disqualification from driving before the court.
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A hospital order made under the Mental Health Act 1983 s.37 ceased to have effect if D was not admitted to the hospital named in the order within the period of 28 days from the date of the making of the order. Where D had been admitted to and detained at a secure unit outside that 28 day period, his detention was unlawful.
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A court had been entitled to conclude that an ASBO was a necessary preventative measure, despite being seized of expert evidence as to D’s learning difficulties and limited intelligence.
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By virtue of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 the FSA was not required to obtain the consent of the secretary of state or the DPP under the CJA 1993 s.61(2) in order to institute proceedings for offences of insider dealing contrary to s.52 of the Act.
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When ruling on a submission of no case to answer to a charge of murder, the Eastern Caribbean CA had erred by failing to apply the test of determining what inferences a reasonable jury properly directed might draw, as distinct from those which the court itself thought could or could not be drawn.
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Although there had been an unusually long period of time between the imposition of a confiscation order against D and the actual proceedings to enforce the order, the delay was the consequence of D’s decision to pursue every avenue of appeal available to him, and was not due to mere passage of time, so the delay was not unreasonable within the meaning of the ECHR art.6.
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A solicitor was not to be regarded as tainted and unreliable because he acted for someone charged with or convicted of a criminal offence. A search warrant for solicitors' offices made under PACE 1984 Sch.1 was unlawful and would be quashed where there was no evidence that that use of a production order under para.4 of Sch.1 might seriously prejudice the investigation through the solicitors failing to comply with their statutory duty not to dispose of the relevant material.
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The appeals of 5 Ds charged under the Terrorism Act 2000 s.38B and the Criminal Law Act 1967 s.4(1) for offences related to the failure to disclose information that they had prior to the London bombings and of assisting an offender were allowed and their sentences reduced accordingly. The sixth D’s appeal was dismissed as her sentence had more than adequately reflected all of the mitigation available to her.
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