When ruling on a submission of no case to answer to a charge of murder, the Eastern Caribbean CA had erred by failing to apply the test of determining what inferences a reasonable jury properly directed might draw, as distinct from those which the court itself thought could or could not be drawn.
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Although there had been an unusually long period of time between the imposition of a confiscation order against D and the actual proceedings to enforce the order, the delay was the consequence of D’s decision to pursue every avenue of appeal available to him, and was not due to mere passage of time, so the delay was not unreasonable within the meaning of the ECHR art.6.
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A solicitor was not to be regarded as tainted and unreliable because he acted for someone charged with or convicted of a criminal offence. A search warrant for solicitors' offices made under PACE 1984 Sch.1 was unlawful and would be quashed where there was no evidence that that use of a production order under para.4 of Sch.1 might seriously prejudice the investigation through the solicitors failing to comply with their statutory duty not to dispose of the relevant material.
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The appeals of 5 Ds charged under the Terrorism Act 2000 s.38B and the Criminal Law Act 1967 s.4(1) for offences related to the failure to disclose information that they had prior to the London bombings and of assisting an offender were allowed and their sentences reduced accordingly. The sixth D’s appeal was dismissed as her sentence had more than adequately reflected all of the mitigation available to her.
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Where a D, a youth, had breached the supervision element of a DTO and was being returned to custody, the words "remainder of the term of the detention and training order" under PCC(S)A 2000 s.104(3) meant the period between the occasion on which it was proved to the satisfaction of the youth court that D had failed to comply with the requirements of s.103(6)(b) of the Act and the expiry of the order.
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Details of offences with which an individual had been charged, but acquitted, were wrongfully included in his enhanced criminal record certificate as, in deciding to disclose those details, the decision-maker failed to have regard to the reasons for the acquittal and it was irrational or unreasonable to conclude that he had committed the offences.
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In order to prove that D was guilty of exceeding a speed limit contrary to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 s.81(1) on a road that was a restricted road by virtue of the provision on it of a system of street lighting, it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the relevant traffic authority had complied with its duty to provide traffic signs warning motorists what the prescribed speed limit was.
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There was no automatic requirement on the prosecution to retain closed-circuit television evidence in cases where it potentially recorded the giving of a warning as required by the Road Traffic Act 1988 s.7(7) when requesting a specimen for analysis where D was suspected of driving with excess alcohol, whether or not the giving of the warning was raised as an issue by the defence before trial.
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The proposition that it was sufficient for an arresting police officer to infer that his superiors must have had reasonable grounds for suspicion before instructing him to arrest a suspect was not the law.
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A decision of the CC to refuse to grant an individual a representation order for a confiscation hearing following his conviction on indictment was not amenable to JR as the DC had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for JR of a decision that pertained to a trial on indictment.
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