In cases of a defence of provocation, the jury must evaluate the gravity of the provocation by starting with the defendant's subjective characteristics and then applying a single, objective standard of the degree of self-control to be expected of a normal person of the defendant's sex and age when assessing whether his loss of self-control was such as to meet the defence. In this case, it was held therefore that the jury could have taken the defendant’s disease of alcoholism into account when ...
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Where it is possible to substitute an offence of causing death by reckless driving with that of manslaughter, juries should be directed on the definition of recklessness if they are to properly consider the charge of manslaughter. In such jurisdictions (e.g. Jamaica, but not England & Wales), the definition of recklessness set out in R v Lawrence [1982] AC 510 and R v Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493 applied, despite the later decision of R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171.
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The incompetence of defence counsel at trial in failing to convey his client's good character and to ensure that the judge directed the jury appropriately could be sufficient grounds for setting aside a guilty verdict as unsafe.
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There was no breach of a defendant’s constitutional right where through his own fault he was unrepresented at trial but a judge or magistrate should not cross examine a defendant in a manner that suggested the judge was siding with the prosecution.
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