R’s opening speech should not deal with the law save where there are issues of real complication and difficulty and the judge agrees the jury would be assisted by it. Convictions were quashed as being unsafe where the trial judge's attitude and conduct towards counsel for D had damaged D’s confidence in the administration of justice in her case and would similarly have damaged the perception of any reasonable observer present at the trial.
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The 5-year mandatory minimum sentence for certain firearms offences, expect in exceptional circumstances, should not be imposed if it would result in an arbitrary and disproportionate sentence.
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It is good practice when charging a D with causing criminal damage by fire to use the word “arson”.
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A judge, when admitting evidence of D’s bad character, had to give a clear warning to the jury that reliance on previous convictions could not by itself prove guilt.
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Distress suffered by D as a result of a co-D’s defence (allegedly false cut-throat defence) did not justify a reduction in sentence.
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The terms of s.109 PCC(S)A 2000 had not been satisfied. Counsel at trial had been wrong to make the concession in relation to possession and D moreover had not admitted possessing a firearm. Therefore s.109(5)(h) had not been made out. In determining the appropriate length of sentence, regard should be had to the scale of the robbery – this had been a street robbery. Therefore the life sentence would be quashed and substituted with 8 years’ imprisonment.
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Although in principle the judge had jurisdiction to stay the confiscation proceedings, it could not be concluded, on the material before the court, that the Ds had discharged the burden of establishing circumstances in which it would have been correct for the judge to order a stay of those proceedings. There was no evidence which showed that the complainant company knew or understood how much had been specifically provided by the Ds, nor was there any statement that the company had received thos ...
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There was jurisdiction for R to appeal under s.9 CJA 1987 against the judge’s order for disclosure. He had properly judged the case as involving allegations of serious fraud. Where an issue of disclosure was argued before a judge at a preparatory hearing held under the 1987 Act’s provisions, it would clearly fall under s.7 1987 Act. On the material before the court, the hearing was an adjourned preparatory hearing from the initial hearing involving abuse and exclusion of evidence. The judge had ...
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Whilst the disgraceful and prolonged driving, albeit committed on a single occasion, would have fully merited a significant uplift from the minimum period of disqualification of 12 months, the disqualification of 5 years was substantially too high in all the circumstances. A disqualification from driving should not, except in the more serious cases, be so severe that it would interfere with a D’s rehabilitation. The disqualification was too long in the light of the fact that D had no previous co ...
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In all the circumstances, there had been an insufficient foundation for the judge to invoke the power to impose an extended sentence under s.85 PCC(S)A 2000. Whilst a judge would be entitled to look at a D’s previous convictions and to invoke the power without other sources of information, on the facts there was an inadequate basis for invoking it. The sentence of 5 years would, of itself, have had a lengthy period of licence. The extended sentence of 9 years would be quashed and a custodial sen ...
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