The terms of s.109 PCC(S)A 2000 had not been satisfied. Counsel at trial had been wrong to make the concession in relation to possession and D moreover had not admitted possessing a firearm. Therefore s.109(5)(h) had not been made out. In determining the appropriate length of sentence, regard should be had to the scale of the robbery – this had been a street robbery. Therefore the life sentence would be quashed and substituted with 8 years’ imprisonment.
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Although in principle the judge had jurisdiction to stay the confiscation proceedings, it could not be concluded, on the material before the court, that the Ds had discharged the burden of establishing circumstances in which it would have been correct for the judge to order a stay of those proceedings. There was no evidence which showed that the complainant company knew or understood how much had been specifically provided by the Ds, nor was there any statement that the company had received thos ...
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There was jurisdiction for R to appeal under s.9 CJA 1987 against the judge’s order for disclosure. He had properly judged the case as involving allegations of serious fraud. Where an issue of disclosure was argued before a judge at a preparatory hearing held under the 1987 Act’s provisions, it would clearly fall under s.7 1987 Act. On the material before the court, the hearing was an adjourned preparatory hearing from the initial hearing involving abuse and exclusion of evidence. The judge had ...
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Whilst the disgraceful and prolonged driving, albeit committed on a single occasion, would have fully merited a significant uplift from the minimum period of disqualification of 12 months, the disqualification of 5 years was substantially too high in all the circumstances. A disqualification from driving should not, except in the more serious cases, be so severe that it would interfere with a D’s rehabilitation. The disqualification was too long in the light of the fact that D had no previous co ...
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In all the circumstances, there had been an insufficient foundation for the judge to invoke the power to impose an extended sentence under s.85 PCC(S)A 2000. Whilst a judge would be entitled to look at a D’s previous convictions and to invoke the power without other sources of information, on the facts there was an inadequate basis for invoking it. The sentence of 5 years would, of itself, have had a lengthy period of licence. The extended sentence of 9 years would be quashed and a custodial sen ...
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The judge had clearly taken an exceptional course in deciding that it was possible to take a further chance with D in order to see if he could recover from the mess that his upbringing had created, although, in all the circumstances, he had been entitled to reach the conclusion that a lenient sentence was justified. Whilst D had subsequently failed to take advantage of the opportunity that the sentence imposed by the judge had provided, the fact that he had not complied with the order did not en ...
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The court had to look not only at the charge for which the sentence was imposed, but at D’s total criminal conduct. The fact that the statutory maximum sentence for attempted unlawful sexual intercourse was a custodial term of 7 years did not render the extended sentence of 6½ years wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. In all the circumstances, a substantial period of imprisonment had been required. The total sentence reflected adequately D’s mitigation and guilty pleas. The aggravating f ...
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D’s proposed questions would have contravened s.41 YJCEA ‘99 on one interpretation, and would have been irrelevant on the other. On any view, the evidence was such that the judge had been correct to refuse D’s application to cross-examine the witness. It followed that it was irrelevant. The convictions were not unsafe.
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The sentence of 2 years’ imprisonment for manslaughter was unduly lenient. It had fallen outside the limits of what could be described as an appropriate level of sentence. Given D’s previous convictions for violence, one would have expected a sentence of imprisonment of greater length. The fact that a death had occurred was a fact that had to be taken into account by the court when determining the appropriate sentencing level. The appropriate sentence following a late guilty plea was in the regi ...
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The sentence was unduly lenient. Although the judge had to make a judgment as to the proper sentence in all the circumstances, it was wholly inappropriate to step outside the normal sentencing guidelines in the absence of wholly exceptional circumstances. The circumstances of here merely afforded mitigation. Whilst there were important mitigating features, particularly D’s remorse and early guilty pleas, and the fact of D’s driving a minicab as an aggravating feature, the fact was that this case ...
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