The High Court of Australia affirmed the general rule that an employer is not vicariously liable for the torts committed by an independent contractor it has employed. The independent contractor was a mechanic engaged by D, a service company responsible for the maintenance of a fridge in a convenience store. The door of the fridge had come loose, causing injury to C.
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Appeal under section 82(4) of the Local Government
This was an appeal by the assessor for Grampian under section 82(4) of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 against a decision of the Valuation Appeal Committee for Moray dated 15 November 2005. It arose from the assessor's decision to alter the Valuation List in relation to a house at 81 Highfield, Forres by transferring it from valuation band C to band D with effect from 10 August 2001. The former owner of the house appealed to the Committee on the ground that the alteration should have been ...
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In this decision, guidelines were set out for the circumstances in which a notice of determination given by a contractor under ss. 28.2.4 and 28.2.5 of the JCT 1998 Private with Quantities standard form will be found to be ‘unreasonable or vexatious’.
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In an action arising out of building works to a property and a subsequent adjudication, C argued that the adjudicator had no jurisdiction to deal with the dispute because inter alia the referral notice was served out of time, being provided 8 days (rather than 7 days) after the notice of intention to refer. HHJ Coulson QC followed the recent decisions of the Scottish courts relating to adjudicators’ decisions served out of time (e.g. Ritchie Brothers plc v David Phillip Commercials Ltd [2005] B ...
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It was held that C had failed to prove that the retention of title clause in its standard trading terms had been incorporated into its mechanical and electrical sub-contract with D (which proceeded on the basis of a DOM/2 standard form, although no contract was ever signed). The clause was in C’s standard terms of business, which were on the back of its order form. The front page of the order form was faxed to D prior to conclusion of the contract, but the back page, containing the terms of bu ...
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X was a company which had a subsidiary called Y. D1 and D2 were providers of scaffolding. Y and D2 were parties to an existing contract for the hire of scaffolding. D1 and D2 entered into an oral contract with X to the effect that D1 and D2 would buy all future scaffolding products from X provided that (i) D2 increased the amount of scaffolding which it hired to Y under the existing contract; (ii) D1 would be allowed to produce scaffolding whilst its existing stock lasted; and (iii) D1 could c ...
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C applied for an injunction to restrain two proposed defendants from continuing arbitration proceedings. C alleged that D3 had paid bribes to D1 and D2 and that the chartering of vessels to D3 formed part of a dishonest conspiracy to injure C’s business by unlawful means. It was held that the court, and not the arbitrator, had jurisdiction to determine the issues because the bribery arguments would impeach the whole contract and therefore the dispute did not arise out of the contract. C had es ...
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Applicant applied for permission to appeal against the judge’s refusal of permission to appeal under s.69(8) of the Arbitration Act 1996. The Court of Appeal held that, although it was settled law that the refusal by the judge of permission to appeal under s.69(8) could not be appealed to the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal nevertheless had a residual discretion in a case of unfairness in the decision-making process. However, there was no unfairness and no breach of Article 6 of the Europ ...
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D, the appellant, was a medical doctor and businessman who used a number of corporate vehicles for his personal and business activities. C had carried out building and architectural work on behalf of D and sought payment from D. D argued at first instance that one of his corporate vehicles (X) was the proper party to the contract and that he had no personal liability. During the trial D changed his account and alleged that it was actually a different corporate vehicle (Y) which was the party ...
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D refused to pay sums awarded to C by an adjudicator. C issued an application for summary judgment to enforce the adjudicator’s award. D entered an acknowledgment of service, and raised a number of technical points in correspondence with C. D made an offer and C made a counter offer, but neither were accepted. However, the day before the hearing of the summary judgment application, D filed a skeleton argument indicating that it would not oppose C’s application. HHJ Coulson QC entered judgme ...
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