It was held that C had failed to prove that the retention of title clause in its standard trading terms had been incorporated into its mechanical and electrical sub-contract with D (which proceeded on the basis of a DOM/2 standard form, although no contract was ever signed). The clause was in C’s standard terms of business, which were on the back of its order form. The front page of the order form was faxed to D prior to conclusion of the contract, but the back page, containing the terms of bu ...
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X was a company which had a subsidiary called Y. D1 and D2 were providers of scaffolding. Y and D2 were parties to an existing contract for the hire of scaffolding. D1 and D2 entered into an oral contract with X to the effect that D1 and D2 would buy all future scaffolding products from X provided that (i) D2 increased the amount of scaffolding which it hired to Y under the existing contract; (ii) D1 would be allowed to produce scaffolding whilst its existing stock lasted; and (iii) D1 could c ...
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C applied for an injunction to restrain two proposed defendants from continuing arbitration proceedings. C alleged that D3 had paid bribes to D1 and D2 and that the chartering of vessels to D3 formed part of a dishonest conspiracy to injure C’s business by unlawful means. It was held that the court, and not the arbitrator, had jurisdiction to determine the issues because the bribery arguments would impeach the whole contract and therefore the dispute did not arise out of the contract. C had es ...
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Applicant applied for permission to appeal against the judge’s refusal of permission to appeal under s.69(8) of the Arbitration Act 1996. The Court of Appeal held that, although it was settled law that the refusal by the judge of permission to appeal under s.69(8) could not be appealed to the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal nevertheless had a residual discretion in a case of unfairness in the decision-making process. However, there was no unfairness and no breach of Article 6 of the Europ ...
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D, the appellant, was a medical doctor and businessman who used a number of corporate vehicles for his personal and business activities. C had carried out building and architectural work on behalf of D and sought payment from D. D argued at first instance that one of his corporate vehicles (X) was the proper party to the contract and that he had no personal liability. During the trial D changed his account and alleged that it was actually a different corporate vehicle (Y) which was the party ...
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D refused to pay sums awarded to C by an adjudicator. C issued an application for summary judgment to enforce the adjudicator’s award. D entered an acknowledgment of service, and raised a number of technical points in correspondence with C. D made an offer and C made a counter offer, but neither were accepted. However, the day before the hearing of the summary judgment application, D filed a skeleton argument indicating that it would not oppose C’s application. HHJ Coulson QC entered judgme ...
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Application for enforcement of adjudicator's decision. C had been retained by D to construct a gas pipeline pursuant to a written contract which provided for referral of disputes to adjudication. The works were delayed and the party resolved that dispute by entering into a supplemental agreement which detailed sums to be paid by D to C. After completion of the works C maintained that it was entitled to further payment above the amounts in the supplemental agreement and it referred the dispute ...
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C’s claim for damages for breach of contracts relating to the construction of a power station and the failure of foundations was rejected by HHJ Toulmin in the TCC. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, it was held that the burden on an appellant in an appeal against a finding of fact in a complicated technical case by a specialist TCC judge was hard to discharge: the more technical and complicated the facts, the harder the burden. The appeal was dismissed.
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D2 and D3 were owners of land which incorporated a tree, the roots of which were causing damage to C1 and C2's adjacent property. The tree was subject to a Tree Preservation Order and D1 had refused permission to fell the tree. C1 and C2 sought a declaration of their entitlement to fell the tree on the basis that it was necessary for the prevention or abatement of a nuisance within section 198(6)(b) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. D1, D2 and D3 maintained that felling could not be ...
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Prior to 2003 the parties entered into a contract for the internal fit out of the Sheraton Hotel Spa Building. Following completion of the main works various defects, some of them substantial, emerged in the work that had been carried out. The most significant of the defects related to the external glazing around the spa area, where cracking had appeared. The parties disputed who was responsible for the cracking
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