Appeals against the Same Order. It would stultify the procedure introduced by the Administration of Justice Act 1969 s.12 and s.13 if different appeals against the same order were to proceed in parallel in different courts. The words “leave is granted” in s.13(2) had to be understood to refer to an unconditional grant of leave or a grant of leave subject to conditions which were accepted or
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Receiver’s Remuneration. The CPR r.69.7(2) did not override the scheme whereby a receiver's remuneration and expenses were to be paid out of the receivership assets.
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Freezing Order without notice. It was very difficult to visualise a case where the grant of a freezing order, made without notice, could be said to have been properly made in the absence of any formulation of the case for substantive relief that the applicant for the order intended to institute.
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Challenge to validity of a person’s title to land. A challenge to the validity of a person's title to land was held to be res judicata and not capable of being re-litigated.
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Where an application for judicial review turned on the proportionality of the defendant's actions, the disclosure of documents would be ordered more readily than in an application where such an issue did not arise. In cases involving issues of proportionality, disclosure should be carefully limited to the issues which required it in the interests of justice.
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Appeal against civil penalty – no rehearing permitted. It was not appropriate to direct a rehearing of an appeal against a civil penalty for dishonest conduct where the evidence sought to be adduced on the rehearing could and should have been dealt with in the previous hearings.
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Professional negligence claim – Law Society cause of action. The Law Society's cause of action in negligence against accountants in respect of negligent reports on a solicitor's practice accrued when it first received a claim on the Solicitors' Compensation Fund from a client whose money was misappropriated by the solicitor, because until such a claim was actually made no loss or damage had been sustained by the fund.
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Limitation Act 1980 – Date of knowledge. The requisite knowledge for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 s.14A(8)(a) was knowledge of the facts constituting the essence of the complaint of negligence. In the circumstances the relevant date was not when the claimant first knew that he might have a claim for damages but the earlier date when he first knew enough to justify setting about investigating the possibility that the defendant's advice was defective.
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Reinstatement of claim which had been struck out. Where a blameless absent litigant whose case had been struck out was seeking its reinstatement, and where there had been no delay and there was no likelihood of prejudice to the other parties, it was for the other parties to show that the case had no chance of success. Prima facie justice required that the case be reinstated.
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Judicature (Civil Procedure Code) Law (Jamacia): The Supreme Court of Jamaica was not deprived of jurisdiction to set aside a judgment in default of defence under s.258 of the Judicature (Civil Procedure Code) Law (Jamaica), even though damages had been subsequently assessed and a final judgment had been entered. Further, it was held that where an order to set aside a default judgment had been made without jurisdiction, a judge of a co-ordinate jurisdiction had no power to set it aside.
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