In divorce proceedings the husband became insolvent before a property adjustment order was made. The wife brought proceedings against her solicitors alleging that they had failed to take sufficient steps to advise her of the effect of bankruptcy on her ancillary relief and that she should not defer seeking a decree of divorce absolute until financial matters had been settled. Although in breach of duty for failing to advise her of the effects of a bankruptcy order on her ancillary relief claim t ...
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Condition precedent: The insurance policy covered accidental injury to holiday makers and contained a condition requiring Kosmar Villa Holidays (“KVH”), a specialist tour operator, to notify insurers immediately of the occurrence of any injury. KVH only notified insurers a year later. Although insurers wrote to KVH requesting further information and informed KVH’s solicitors that it would take over the conduct of the claim that did not amount to waiver by estoppel. The repudiation for breach of ...
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Settlements: Lexington insured the property of Alcoa. The period of insurance cover ran from 1st July 1977 to 1st July 1980. Lexington purchased facultative reinsurance with Wasa and AGF for the same years and limit of liability on the assumption that it was “back-to-back” cover. Alcoa subsequently sought to recover remedial clean up costs from Lexington. The US Court held that Lexington was liable for these costs, irrespective of whether the damage was sustained before, during or after the ince ...
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The Claimant obtained permission to appeal. The Court of Appeal referred at the behest of the defendant solicitors that the trial judge determine a further question the result of which was that the appeal stood no prospect of success. The Claimant then sought to amend its grounds of appeal on the basis that the judge was predisposed to find against the Claimant. Although something the Claimant evidently believed, there was no material on which such an objection could properly be sustained.
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The Claimant company and its owner sought to acquire Fulham football club. The vendors wished to keep a stake in the club and so the vehicle for the acquisition was a joint venture company in which the Claimant was to hold “A” shares and the vendors “B” shares. The vendors were protected by certain provisions in the Articles of Association whereby as long as the “B” shares represented at least 10% of the nominal value of the issued share capital, their written consent was required before certain ...
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Honda made summary judgment applications against a number of defendants who sold Honda motorbikes in the UK which had been imported from outside the EU. An issue arose as to consent in relation to bikes which had been purchased from Honda’s Australian subsidiary. Honda had the evidential burden as to whether the Australian subsidiary imposed a relevant restriction on resales abroad. It was held that there was insufficient evidence that such a restriction was imposed during various periods and ...
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Under s.31 OAPA 1961, the words “spring-gun, man-trap, or other engine calculated to destroy human life or inflict grievous bodily harm” should not be given an unduly narrow meaning.
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It was good practice for the prosecution when seeking to introduce evidence under s.101(1)(d) CJA 2003 to provide full particulars of the convictions relied upon. However, this was not mandatory and a list of convictions may suffice as definition of ‘character’ was wide.
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The expression “breach of duty” in the Limitation Act 1980 s.32 included a claim under the Insolvency Act s.423. However, there must be a legal wrongdoing of a kind that could properly be raised in an action to which s.32 of the Act applied.
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D had engaged C to carry out demolition, piling and other works in respect of two buildings pursuant to a JCT Standard Form. The parties fell into dispute regarding C's entitlement to extensions of time together with related loss and expense. During an adjudication D argued that the losses claimed by C could not be recovered because they related to a later period than the period for which the extension of time was claimed. The adjudicator held that he was not bound by the same period when consid ...
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